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Evaluating the Post-closure Safety of Geological Disposal of Long-lived Radioactive Wastes


Professor Alan Hooper


Presentation to IKIMP Workshop

St Anne's College, Oxford


13-14 October 2009

The basic layout of the repository





And so on into the far distant future...



How harmful is the dose?

Toxicity

Human uptake

What routes give a dose?

Environmental behaviour

What are we trying to model the performance of?

How does rock delay movement?

How can the rock be 'short circuited'?

Groundwater flow

Gas

Rock matrix diffusion

Sorption

Diffusion and dispersion



Human intervention

Natural disruptive events

0 100 1000 10 000 100 000 1 million Time (years)

Regulatory Risk Guidance Level

- Radiological risk to an individual of one in a million per year (of fatal cancer or serious hereditary effect)
- Term 'radiological risk' reflects stochastic response to low-level radiation doses
- Risk calculated for comparison with guidance level reflects both the probability that a given dose will be received and the probability of the relevant effect on health
- Provides a source of much confusion when understandably thought of as 'risk of failure'

Types of uncertainty

- In a repository system there are a number of different areas in which uncertainty may influence a performance assessment;
 - uncertainty over future states of the system
 - data uncertainty
 - model uncertainty
 - uncertainty about human behaviour

Approach to Scenarios

- Base scenario
 - may include major time-dependent effects such as expected climate change
 - deals with the release of radionuclides in groundwater or in gaseous form
- Variant scenarios
 - are defined by an initiating event, e.g. an earthquake, hence a deviation from the base scenario
 - includes human intrusion and nuclear criticality


Treatment of uncertainty within a scenario

- FEP analysis and the systematic development of scenarios can deal with some uncertainties connected with the future
- For a defined scenario, there are other uncertainties:
 - data uncertainty
 - including uncertainty resulting from spatial variability and time-dependence
 - conceptual and mathematical model uncertainty


Strategies for handling uncertainty

1. Demonstrating that the uncertainty is irrelevant
 - e.g. safety controlled by other processes
2. Addressing the uncertainty explicitly
 - representing by PDFs in a probabilistic calculation
 - scoping effect of range of uncertainty by deterministic sensitivity calculations
3. Bounding the uncertainty
 - making conservative assumptions
4. Ruling out the uncertainty on the basis of low probability
5. Explicitly ignoring uncertainty or agreeing a stylised approach for handling an irreducible uncertainty

Hierarchy of models to calculate overall performance measure (e.g. risk)



Reference Case radiological risk against time (GPA03 Update)



Groundwater Pathway

What does risk depend on?

$$R_{\text{peak}} \propto \frac{I N G 0.06 B}{\sqrt{\sigma_s^2 + \sigma_g^2}}$$

R_{peak} = peak risk

σ_s = source term spreading time

I = inventory

σ_g = geosphere spreading time

N = fraction released from repository

G = fraction released from geosphere


B = biosphere factor 0.06 = dose to risk factor

Iodine-129

- Iodine-129 has a half life of 15.7 million years
- Inventory of iodine-129 is 1.5 TBq
- Iodine is very soluble and mobile
- Source term spreading time, σ_s , depends on flux through repository, Q
- Geosphere spreading time, σ_g , depends on travel time, T


Iodine-129 Travel time v Flux

| | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|----|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Worksheet: | Data | | Radionuclide is: | I-129 |
| Radionuclide: | (0-39) 14 | OK | Near-field solubility: | Central values |
| Near-field solubility: | (1-7,X,Y) 3 | OK | Near-field sorption: | Central values |
| Near-field sorption: | (1-7,X,Y) 3 | OK | Far-field sorption: | Central values |
| Far-field sorption: | (1-7,X,Y) 3 | OK | Flux (Q): | Plotted on the X axis |
| Flux (Q): | (1-7,X,Y) X | OK | Travel time (T): | Plotted on the Y axis |
| Travel time (T): | (1-7,X,Y) Y | OK | | |



Assessment Timeframes

Despite major change to the whole system over very long timescales continuing safety is demonstrated through the use of qualitative arguments



TF1
Containment

TF2
The Package

TF3
The Chemical
Barrier

TF4
The Geological
Barrier

TF5
Continuing
Safety

Concluding Remarks

- Radioactive waste management programmes have developed a wealth of modelling and assessment techniques and experience in presenting post-closure safety cases.
- Despite “nuclear dread” geological repositories are variously operating, fully licensed or well advanced through licensing, in a number of countries with strong, independent regulation.
- Information on the intrinsic safety of multi-barrier containment systems has proved a powerful complement to numerical modelling.